This paper studies a sale promotion mechanism design problem on a social network, where a node (a seller) sells one item to the other nodes on the network to maximize her revenue. However, the seller does not know other nodes except for her neighbours and her neighbours have no incentive to promote the sale. Hence, the goal is to design an auction mechanism such that the seller's neighbours are incentivized to invite their neighbours to join the auction, while the seller's revenue is guaranteed to increase. This is not achievable with traditional mechanisms. One solution has been proposed recently by carefully designing a reward scheme for the nodes who have invited others. However, the solution only gives rewards to some cut-points of the network, but cut-points rarely exist in a well-connected network, which actually disincentivizes nodes' participation. Therefore, we propose another novel mechanism to reward more related participants with fairer rewards, and the seller's revenue is even improved compared to the previous solution.
Introduction
Marketing is a vital element in the development of the economy. Due to limited personal social connections, sellers often seek various kinds of ways to enlarge the market and attract more potential buyers. Traditionally, they tend to sell products via online shopping platforms such as Amazon and eBay. However, the platforms cannot always maximize the sellers' revenue because it may cost a large amount of money for using the platforms' services such as advertisement.
Alternatively, a seller can hold an auction among her neighbours using the classic auction protocol Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) (Clarke 1971; Vickrey 1961; Groves 1973) with an optimal reserve price (Myerson 1981), which optimizes the seller's revenue locally. To further increase the seller's revenue, diffusion mechanisms on social networks have been proposed to attract more buyers. Li et al. (2017) proposed the first such auction on social networks, called information diffusion mechanism (IDM). IDM can incentivize the seller's neighbours to propagate the auction information to their neighbours, and these newly informed neighbours will do the same. Eventually, all potential buyers on the network are informed, which improves the seller's revenue. To achieve this goal, IDM distributes dedicated rewards to the cut-points from the seller to the winner who receives the item. However, according to the theorem of small-world networks (Amaral et al. 2000) , the chance for a node to be a cutpoint in a well-connected social network is very low. Hence, only a very small proportion of the buyers on the network can benefit from the mechanism, which disincentivizes buyers' participation.
Therefore, in this paper, we propose another novel diffusion mechanism, which distributes the rewards to all the related buyers not only the cut-points on the paths to the winner. In addition to the cut-points, we also pay a group of buyers who are not cut-points alone but can disconnect the winner from the seller together with other non-cut-points. They are less important compared to the cut-points, but still critical. Under this mechanism, we can still ensure that buyers will report their truthful valuation for the item and invite all their neighbours without a predefined reward. More importantly, we tackled the challenge without sacrificing the seller's revenue, i.e., the seller's revenue in our mechanism is at least as good as that in the previous work.
There exists some closely related work on social networks (Easley and Kleinberg 2010; Scott 1988) . For instance, Li et al. (2019) gave a class of mechanisms similar to IDM and proved that IDM gives the lowest revenue in the class. However, they still focused on distributing rewards to the cut-points while the major goal of our mechanism is to also give rewards to all the related buyers. Wang and Chiu (2008) presented a recommendation system to calculate the level of recommendation for online auctions. Pandit et al. (2007) designed a system based on social networks to avoid auction fraud. They mainly focused on the applications in the real-world without considering the mathematical properties of the mechanisms, while we look at the game theoretical properties of the mechanism on networks.
In our mechanism, in order to pay the non-cut-points, we have applied some techniques from the redistribution mechanism design literature. Many redistribution mechanisms have been proposed to redistribute the surplus back to the buyers as reward (Cavallo 2006; Guo and Conitzer 2009; Guo 2011) . The objective of their redistribution mechanisms is to satisfy the budget balance property, which is to give back the payments to the participants as much as possi-ble. However, in our setting, we are aiming to improve the seller's revenue through getting more potential buyers. Thus, we only borrow the idea of the redistribution to reward more buyers in our mechanism while improving the seller's revenue (budget-balance would not give any revenue to the seller).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the necessary preliminaries of the problem. Next, we define some basic concepts and introduce our novel mechanism in detail, and show the advantages of our mechanism compared to the previous work. Then we show the key properties of our mechanism. Finally, we conclude our work and discuss future work.
Preliminaries
We consider a market where seller s sells an item in a social network. The network is modelled as an undirected graph G = (V, E), where V = N ∪ {s} = {1, 2, . . . , n} ∪ {s} denotes the set of all nodes of the network and E denotes the set of all the edges. Each i ∈ N represents a potential buyer of the item, and she has a set of neighbours r i ⊆ V . Node j ∈ r i if there is an edge e ij ∈ E connecting buyer i and buyer j. Each buyer i ∈ V has a depth d i > 0 representing the length of the shortest path from the seller to i. Each buyer i ∈ V has a private valuation v i ≥ 0 for receiving the item. We assume that the seller's valuation for the item is zero. Figure 1 shows an example on the social network, where the letter beside each node is the label of a buyer and the value in each node is the buyer's private valuation for receiving the item.
Traditionally, since the seller s has no prior knowledge about the network, she can only sell the item among her neighbours r s without doing any advertising. In order to gain more revenue, the seller has to invite more potential buyers with higher valuations to join the sale. This can be achieved by asking her neighbours to invite their neighbours to join the sale. However, they would not invite their neighbours to compete with them without any incentive. Hence, we build incentives to tackle this challenge in this paper.
In this paper, we propose a novel diffusion mechanism, which aims to reward all the related buyers who also make a contribution for inviting the winner but not only the cutpoints as the previous work did. Also, all the buyers are incentivized to not only report their private valuations for the item to the mechanism but also propagate the sale information to all their neighbours voluntarily without prepaid rewards. Our mechanism will not reduce the seller's revenue compared to the previous work.
For each buyer i ∈ N , let θ i = (v i , r i ) be i's type and the type profile of all the buyers is denoted as θ = (θ 1 , . . . , θ n ). Let θ −i be the type profile for buyers except i, and we can also represent the type profile as θ = (θ −i , θ i ). Let Θ i be the type space for buyer i and Θ = (Θ 1 , . . . , Θ n ) = (Θ −i , Θ i ) be the type profile space for all buyers.
In the mechanism, each buyer i ∈ N is required to report her type. Let a i = (v i , r i ) be the i's reported type where v i represents the valuation she reported and r i represents the neighbours she has invited. If she is not involved in the mechanism, let a i = nil. Definition 1. We say an action profile a is feasible if for each buyer i ∈ N with a i = nil, there must exist at least one path P si = (s, k 1 , . . . , k m , i) from s to i, where k 1 ∈ r s , i ∈ r km and k t+1 ∈ r kt for 1 ≤ t < m. In other words, without invitation, the buyers cannot join to the sale. Let F(θ) ⊆ Θ be the set of all feasible action profiles.
Definition 2. A diffusion mechanism M on the social network is defined by an allocation policy π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . . , π n ) and a payment policy p = (p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p n ), where π i : Θ → {0, 1} and p i : Θ → R.
Given an action profile a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ F(θ), the payment policy p(a) = (p 1 (a), . . . , p n (a)) represents the money each buyer is asked to pay. For buyer i ∈ N , if p i (a) ≥ 0, then she needs to pay p i to the seller, and if p i (a) < 0, she will receive |p i (a)| from the seller. The allocation policy π(a) = (π 1 (a), . . . , π n (a)) represents the item allocation result, and we have π i (a) = 1 if buyer i receives the item 0 if buyer i does not receive the item
Since there is only one item to sell, we say the allocation π is feasible if no more than one buyer with a i = nil receives the item under all feasible action profiles. We will only consider feasible allocation policies in the following discussion.
Definition 3. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ) and a feasible allocation π, the social welfare of allocation π(a) is i∈N π i (a)v i .
Under the diffusion mechanism M = (π, p), we assume that there is no cost for a buyer to spread the sale information to her neighbours. Thus, for buyer i ∈ N of type profile θ i , given a feasible action profile a of all buyers, i's utility is defined as
We say a diffusion mechanism is individually rational if the utility of each buyer involved is non-negative as long as she reports the valuation truthfully no matter how many neighbours she invites.
Traditionally, if all the buyers are willing to report their truthful valuations for the item, we say the mechanism satisfies the property of incentive compatibility or truthfulness. However, in our mechanism, buyers also need to invite the neighbours. Thus, we want to incentivize buyers not only to report their truthful valuations but also to invite all their neighbours. Therefore, we define incentive compatibility as follows.
, for all i ∈ N , all θ ∈ Θ and all a, a ∈ F(θ) such that a i = θ i and a = f (a, a i ), where f is a mapping function that if i changes her action to a i , other buyers remains their action except that the action of those who cannot be connected to s should be nil.
In the following section, we will introduce a novel diffusion mechanism rewarding all the related buyers who also make a contribution for inviting the winner, which satisfies the properties of IR and IC. We further prove that the revenue of the seller under our mechanism is higher than that of the traditional VCG in which the seller sells the item among her neighbours, and also higher than that of the previous work.
Fair Diffusion Mechanism
In this section, we will introduce our advanced mechanism called the fair diffusion mechanism (FDM). This mechanism aims to distribute rewards to all the related buyers (not only the cut-points) with IR and IC guaranteed, which is achieved without sacrificing the sellers revenue (even better than the previous work (Li et al. 2017)).
Before we introduce our mechanism, we need some additional definitions.
Definition 6. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for each buyer i ∈ N , if there exists no path from the seller to i without the participation of a set D i ⊆ N , we say D i is a cut set of buyer i. If there is no proper subset D i ⊂ D i which is also a cut set of i, we say D i is a minimal cut set of buyer i.
The cut sets of a buyer are the buyers who can separate the buyer from the seller and all the minimal cut sets can be induced from the cut sets. For example, in Figure 2 Definition 7. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for each buyer i, j ∈ N , we say j is a critical ancestor of i if j belongs to a minimal cut set of buyer i.
Definition 8. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for each buyer i, j ∈ N , we say j is a strong critical ancestor of i if j alone forms a minimal cut set of i. We say j is a weak critical ancestor of i if j is a critical ancestor, but not strong critical ancestor of i.
Intuitively, for each buyer i ∈ N , her critical ancestors are those who are on some simple path from the seller to i. Strong critical ancestors are the cut points from the seller to i, while weak critical ancestors are those who connect strong critical ancestors. All these critical ancestors have a contribution to connect the seller and buyer i. In Figure 2 (a), all the colored nodes are the critical ancestors of buyer m, where nodes in orange are strong critical ancestors and nodes in yellow are weak critical ancestors. Definition 9. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ),
We can easily observe that on a social network, if a buyer i quits the mechanism, her critical descendant set will not be involved in the auction. Here, we use the notation N −i to represent the vertex set in the new network without the Figure 2 (b) as an example, as all the red nodes cannot be involved in the mechanism without the participation of buyer b, they are critical de-
Definition 10. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for each buyer i ∈ N , let C i be the strong critical ancestor sequence of i, denoted by
Each c i j ∈ C i is a strong critical ancestor of buyer i and the order is determined by the relation of depth
To simplify the description, let C = {c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c h } be the strong critical ancestor sequence of the highest bidder h among all the buyers on the network. Definition 11. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), for each c i , c i+1 ∈ C, let M cici+1 be the weak critical ancestor set between c i and c i+1 , denoted by
As shown in Figure 2 (a), buyer m is the highest bidder with reported valuation v m = 14. Therefore, the strong critical ancestor sequence of m is C = {b, l, m} and the weak critical ancestor sets are M bl = {h, k, g, j, f } and M lm = ∅.
Li et al. (2017) proposed a diffusion mechanism IDM on the social network. Their mechanism does satisfy the IC property we have defined. However, it only distributes rewards to the winner's strong critical ancestors on the network and ignores the contribution of the winner's weak critical ancestors. Therefore, only a few specific nodes may receive a non-zero utility for diffusing the information.
In contrast, the diffusion rewards in our mechanism are distributed more fairly. Especially, not only strong critical ancestors are rewarded, but also weak critical ancestors who are not cut-points but do diffuse the sale mechanism to the winner are rewarded. Moreover, the seller's revenue under our mechanism is at least as good as that in IDM. Now, we are ready to describe our fair diffusion mechanism.
Fair Diffusion Mechanism (FDM)
1. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), find the highest bidder h ∈ arg max i∈N v i (with random tiebreaking). Let v 1 st D = max i∈D v i be the maximum reported valuation in the subset D ⊆ N , and then v h = v 1 st N . Let g 1 st D ∈ arg max i∈D v 1 st Vi (with random tie-breaking) be the strong critical ancestor in the subset D ⊆ N of the highest bidder in V D . 2. Then, the allocation policy can be recursively defined as:
• Allocation Policy:
and k∈N−i π k (a) = 0 0 otherwise 3. According to the allocation policy, we can get a winner c w ∈ C with π cw (a) = 1. Then we distribute rewards to the buyers on the strong critical ancestor sequenceĈ = {c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c w } and the weak critical ancestors w−1 j=1 M cj cj+1 . 4. We have the payment policy defined as:
• Payment Policy: where R i is defined as:
The intuition behind the FDM is that the mechanism allocates the item to the first buyer c j in the strong critical ancestor sequence of the highest bidder whose reported valuation is the highest among all the buyers if c j+1 ∪ M cj cj+1 are not involved in the auction, where c j+1 is the next strong critical ancestor and M cj cj+1 is the weak critical ancestor set between c j and c j+1 .
For each strong critical ancestor c j ∈Ĉ, her payment consists of three parts: the money she paid v 1 st N−c j to the last strong critical ancestor, the money she received v 1 st N −c j+1 ∪Mc j c j+1 from the next strong critical ancestor and the reward redistributed to her R cj . The money paid is the highest reported valuation without her participation and the money received is the highest reported valuation without the participation of c j+1 ∪ M cj cj+1 . Specially, for the winner, the money received from the next critical ancestor is zero. Since the money paid and the money received between two strong critical ancestors c j and c j+1 are not always equal, the mechanism redistributes the difference to the weak critical ancestors M cj cj+1 and the strong critical ancestor c j+1 . Inspired by the VCG redistribution mechanism (Cavallo 2006), the redistributed reward of buyer i ∈ M cj cj+1 ∪ c j+1 is calculated by the lower-bound of the new difference over all possible reported type of i divided by the number of the buyers sharing the reward, which is |M cj cj+1 |+1. Based on the social network discussed before, here we give a running example of FDM in Figure 3 . Among all the buyers on the network, buyer m reports the highest valuation with v m = 14. Then C = {b, l, m} is the strong critical ancestor sequence of m. According to the allocation policy, the item is given to buyer l because v l = v 1 st N −m∪M lm . Thus, the strong critical ancestor sequence of l isĈ = {b, l} and the weak critical ancestor set is M bl = {h, k, g, j, f }. We first consider the strong critical ancestors. For buyer b, the money she pays to the seller is v 1 st N −b = v i = 7 and the money she receives from buyer l is v 1 st N −l∪M bl
= v e = 8. Similarly, for buyer l, the money she pays is v 1 st N −l = v h = 11 and she receives nothing since she is the winner. Therefore, the difference between the money paid by buyer l and the money received by buyer b is ∆ = 11 − 8 = 3. Then we redistribute the difference to M bl and l, and the number of buyers sharing the reward is 6. For buyer l, if she does not participate in the mechanism, the winner will be h who will pay v k = 10. Then the difference becomes ∆ = 10 − 8 = 2. So the reward to l is R l = 2/6 = 1/3. Similarly, for buyer h, the difference will also become ∆ = 10 − 8 = 2 without her participation. Thus, we have R h = 2/6 = 1/3. For buyer f, g, j, k, the difference will not change if any of them is not involved in the mechanism, so we have R f = R g = R j = R k = 3/6 = 1/2. Till now, M bl and l are redistributed the rewards. The remaining money ∆ − M bl ∪l R i = 3 − 2 * 1/3 − 4 * 1/2 = 1/3 will be given to the seller. Then the payment for all the critical buyers is calculated as: p b = 7 − 8 = −1, p l = 11 − 1/3 = 32/3, p h = −1/3 and p f = p g = p j = p k = −1/2. According to the definition of utility, we have u b = π b (a)v b − p b = 0 − (−1) = 1, u l = 13 − 32/3 = 7/3, u h = 0 − (−1/3) = 1/3 and u f = u g = u j = u k = 0 − 1/2 = 1/2. The revenue of the seller is u s = p b + p l + p h + p f + p g + p j + p k = (−1) + 32/3 + (−1/3) + 4 * (−1/2) = 22/3.
Comparison between FDM and IDM
To show the advantages of our mechanism over the previous related work, here we compare the running result for the same example under IDM and analyze the performance of FDM and IDM.
Compared to the IDM proposed by Li et al. (2017) , they only give rewards to those strong critical ancestors. As the running example shown in Figure 4(b) for the same social network, under IDM, buyer l is also the winner with p l = 11 and the utility of strong critical ancestor b is 4, but all the other buyers on the network will have zero utilities. This is because none of the other buyers is a cut-point to reach l from s. In contrast, five more buyers f, g, h, j and k, who (0,0,1/2) (0,0,1/2) (0,0,1/3) (0,0,1/2) (0,0,1/2) (11,0,1/3) are also on some simple path from the seller to the winner, gain positive utilities in the same setting under FDM in Figure 4(a) . Although they are not cut-points to reach l from s, they can disconnect l from s together. Therefore, FDM also considers their diffusion contribution from this aspect, which is fairer for all the related buyers in the network. Moreover, the seller's revenue under FDM is 22/3 which is bigger than 7 in IDM.
FDM IDM
winner buyer l buyer l social welfare 13 13 beneficial buyers b, f, g, h, j, k, l b, l # of beneficial buyers 7 2 beneficial critical ancestor ratio 1 0.29 buyers' total utility 5.67 6 seller's revenue 7.33 7 Table 1 : The performance difference of FDM and IDM. Table 1 gives an intuitive display for the performance difference between FDM and IDM of the same running example. We can obviously observe that although the winner and the social welfare are the same for the two mechanisms, the number of beneficial buyers in FDM is far greater than that of IDM. Furthermore, the beneficial critical ancestor ratio, i.e., the percentage of positive-utility buyers over all the critical ancestors, is 1 in FDM while 0.29 in IDM. This indicates that all the critical ancestors of the winner in FDM but only a tiny fraction in IDM will be rewarded, which shows the fairness of our mechanism. On the other hand, in spite of the decrease of the buyers' total utility, the seller's revenue under FDM is much higher than IDM without sacrificing any desirable properties, which encourages the seller more to apply our mechanism.
Properties of FDM
In this section, we will prove that FDM satisfies the properties of IR and IC, and the seller's revenue is at least as good as the revenue under IDM, which is no less than that of traditional VCG among neighbours.
Firstly, we show that all the buyers in our mechanism will not have negative utilities if they report their valuation truthfully. Theorem 1. The fair diffusion mechanism is individually rational.
Proof. After the execution of the FDM, only critical buyers may have non-zero utilities. Since R i is the redistributed reward, it is obvious that R i ≥ 0 according to the definition.
Since buyer c j is ahead of M cj cj+1 on any path from seller to the winner, we have V cj ⊃ V cj+1∪Mc j c j+1 and then N −cj+1∪Mc j c j+1 ⊃ N −cj . Thus, we have u cj (a) = v 1 st
• For buyer i = c w , since she is the winner, we have
. Then her utility is u cw (a) =
The payments for all the other buyers are zero. Therefore, the FDM is individually rational.
Theorem 2 proves that in FDM, all the buyers are incentivized to report their truthful type to the seller, i.e., their truthful valuations and all their neighbours. Theorem 2. The fair diffusion mechanism is incentive compatible.
Proof. According to the definition of incentive compatibility, we have to prove that for all the buyers in the graph, reporting their truthful valuations for the item and propagating the sale information to all their neighbours is the dominant strategy. Note that we do not consider the collaboration between buyers. More concretely, each buyer i ∈ N can only cut the edges to the neighbours who also belong to her critical descendant set, which is r i ∩V i , because those neighbours can only receive the sale information from i. However, the other neighbours can receive the information from the seller through other paths to connect i, then buyer i cannot cut the edges by herself.
The buyers on the network can be divided into four groups in FDM:
(1) the non-winner strong critical ancestors c j ∈Ĉ \ c w .
(2) the weak critical ancestors between strong critical ancestors.
(3) the winner c w who receives the item.
(4) all the other buyers who are not in group (1), (2) and (3).
• For any strong critical ancestor c j in Group (1): -If the neighbour set r cj reported is fixed, the utility of buyer c j is defined by
, which is not related to her reported valuation v cj . If the allocation is unchanged, no matter what valuation she reports, her utility remains the same. If she reports a higher valuation to be the winner, the reward redistributed remains the same and her utility becomes
-If the valuation v cj reported is fixed and r cj = r cj .
* If she is still the strong critical ancestor, we have N −cj+1∪M c j c j+1 ⊆ N −cj+1∪Mc j c j+1 , and then v 1 st
. Since the money paid v 1 st N−c j and the reward redistributed R cj remains the same, removing neighbours may decrease the money she received. * If she becomes a weak critical ancestor with positive utility, then her utility becomes
* If she becomes the new winner, the reward redistributed remains the same and her utility becomes
* If she is neither a strong critical ancestor nor a weak critical ancestor, her utility u cj = 0.
• For any weak critical ancestor i ∈ M cj−1cj in Group (2): -If the neighbour set r i reported is fixed, the utility of buyer i is defined by
, which is not related to her reported valuation v i . If the allocation is unchanged, no matter what valuation she reports, her utility remains the same. If she reports a higher valuation to be the winner, the reward redistributed to her remains the same and her utility becomes
-If the valuation v i reported is fixed and r i = r i . The utility of buyer i is u i = R i , which is not related to i's critical descendants. Since there is no other strong critical ancestors in the weak critical ancestor set for any weak critical ancestor, removing some neighbours cannot decrease the number of buyers sharing the reward. Therefore, misreporting neighbours cannot increase the utility. • For the winner c w in Group (3):
-If the neighbour set r cw reported is fixed, the utility of buyer c w is defined by 
If she becomes a strong critical ancestor of her critical descendants, her utility will be u cw = v 1 st
.
-If the valuation v cw reported is fixed and r cw = r cw , the utility of buyer c w is defined by u cw = v cw + . Thus the allocation will not be changed, and no matter what valuation she reports, her utility remains the same. • For any other buyer i in Group (4):
-If the neighbour set r i reported is fixed, the utility of buyer i is zero. If c w is not her strong critical ancestor, the only way she can gain some benefits is to report a higher valuation to win the item. However, if she reports v i > v 1 st N > v i , her payment will be the original maximum valuation on the network, which is greater than her truthful valuation. If c w is her strong critical ancestor, no matter what valuation she reports, the allocation will not be changed.
-If the valuation v i reported is fixed and r i = r i , removing some neighbours will not change the allocation.
In summary, we can draw the conclusion that the FDM is incentive compatible.
Then we prove that our FDM can improve the seller's revenue compared to the previous work IDM without sacrificing other properties, which encourages the seller to apply our mechanism.
Theorem 3. The seller's revenue under fair diffusion mechanism is always at least as good as the revenue under IDM, which is no less than that of traditional VCG among neighbours.
Proof. Given a feasible action profile a ∈ F(θ), the seller's revenue is the sum of the first critical ancestor c 1 's payment and all the rewards redistributed to the seller, i.e., u F DM s (a, (π, p)) = i∈N p i (a, (π, p)) = cj ∈Ĉ−c w
where R s is the remaining money of the difference which is not redistributed among the critical ancestors. It is easy to confirm that R s ≥ 0.
While under the IDM, the seller's revenue is defined by u IDM s (a, (π, p)) = v 1 st N−c 1 . Thus, we have (a, (π, p)). Therefore, the seller's revenue in FDM is non-negative and at least as good as that in IDM, which is also no less than that in traditional VCG among neighbours.
Since the seller's revenue is the sum of the first strong critical ancestor's payment and the reward redistributed to her, we can easily observe that the seller's revenue in IDM is the lower bound of that in FDM.
Conclusion
In this paper, we propose an advanced diffusion mechanism on social networks. The seller can run the mechanism without paid third-party platforms and gain a higher revenue. Our mechanism guarantees that buyers participated are incentivized to offer their truthful valuations for the item and invite all their neighbours to the sale. All the related critical buyers on some simple path from the seller to the winner will be rewarded for their diffusion effort, which is fairer than other mechanisms proposed in previous work. Moreover, the seller's revenue in our mechanism is also improved compared to other related work.
On the basis of our work, many other problems are worth further investigation. One direction is to generalize FDM to a more complex setting for multiple items (Zhao et al. 2018) . Since the item can be passed through the critical ancestors in FDM, it gives us a good chance to study a distributed method to realize our mechanism. What's more, the falsename attack is a difficult problem in mechanism design. False-name attacks also exist in our network setting. We find it also worthwhile to consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium to maximize the seller's revenue if given a valuation distribution on social networks (Jain and Walrand 2008; Hartline et al. 2008) . Another valuable future work can be generalizing our mechanism to broader settings such as weighted networks to achieve the same goal (Li et al. 2019) . FDM considers to reward all buyers on the simple paths to reach the winner. What about the others who are not on these paths, but their valuations play an important role to determine the payments? Should they also be rewarded?
